Information of relevance to human failure was extracted from the firs! 2,000 incidents reported to !he Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS). All reports were searched for human factors amongst the ''factors contributing'; ''factors minimising'; and "suggested corrective strategies" categories, and these were classified according to the type of human error with which they were associated. In 83% of the reports elements of human error were scored by reporters, "Knowledgebased errors" contributed directly to about one-quarter of incidents; the outcome of one third of incidents was thought to have been minimised by prior experience or awareness of the potential problems, and in one fifth some strategy to improve knowledge was suggested. Correction of "rule-based errors" or provision of protocols or algorithms were thought, together, to have a potential impact on nearly half of all incidents. Failure to check equipment or the patient contributed to nearly one-quarter of all incidents, and inadequate crisis management contributed to a further 1 in 8. "Skill-based errors" (slips and lapses) were directly responsible for 1 in 10 of all incidents, and were thought to make an indirect contribution in up to one quarter. "Technical errors" were responsible for about 1 in 8 incidents, Analysing the relative contribution of each type of error for each type of problem allows the development of rational preventative strategies. Continued efforts must be made to improve the knowledge-base of anaesthetists, but AIMS has shown that there may also be much to gain from directing attention towards eliminating rule-based errors, for promoting the use of protocols, check-lists and crisis management algorithms, and improving anaesthetists' insight into the factors contributing and circumstances in which slips and lapses may occur. Traditional patterns of behaviour in doctors may also make them more liable to certain types of human error; removing the onus for adhering to standards and approved work practices from the individual to the "system" may lead to more consistent application of the "best practice':
All anaesthetists aspire to an anaesthesia "system" that is completely safe. However, any system operated by human beings is subject to human failure; this is both normal and inevitable. I In fact, there are elements of human error amongst the immediate precursors of 80-900,70 of failures of most systems. 2, 3 The majority of such failures are recognised and intercepted before they lead to harm, and the complex anaesthesia system is no exception in this respect (e.g. a loose circuit connection seen and fixed; a wrong ampoule opened but recognised before the drug is drawn up). Because patterns of human error in anaesthesia, as elsewhere, are identifiable, predictable and repetitive, they lend themselves to classification and analysis. 3 ,< From such analyses we gain a clearer understanding of how anaesthetists behave, which is an important step in the logical evolution of strategies to make such failures less common.
It was therefore decided to study the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS), looking for information relating to "human failure" in clinical anaesthetic practice.
METHODS
Information of relevance to the subject of human failure was extracted from the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS. AIMS involves the voluntary, anonymous reporting of any unintended incident which reduced, or could have reduced, the safety margin for a patient. Details of the AIMS reporting form and methods are provided elsewhere in this symposium. 5 The AIMS database was searched for all reports among the first 2000 incidents which contained any "human factors" scored by reporters amongst the lists in "Item Anae,o,rhe,.,ia and In/el/jive Care, vol. 2/, /\/0. 5, Ocwbu, 1993 4" on the report form ("factors contributing":'factors minimizing" and "suggested corrective strategies"; see Figure 1 , p. 523).5
RESULTS
The "factors contributing to incidents", "factors minimising the outcome" and "suggested corrective strategies" in the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS are ranked according to the frequency with which they were "ticked" on the report forms and classified as being representative or associated with 5 error-or problem-types in Tables I, 2 and 3 respectively. Types 1-5 were thought to represent or be associated with, respectively, knowledge-based errors, rule-based errors, skill-based errors, technical errors and system-based problems. 3 At least one of the Type 1-4 factors (i.e. those representing human error) was ticked for 1660 (83070) of the first 2000 incidents.
TABLE I
Contributing factors in the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS, 5 ranked according to the frequency with which they were "ticked" on the report forma. At least one human factor' (types 1-4) was "ticked" in 1215 (61%) of the 2000 incidents.
Contributing Factors" Type b
No. I  326  16  Failure to check equipment  2  265  13  Fault of technique  4  264  13  Other factor  5  255  13  Other equipment problem  5  254  13  Inattention  3  238  12  Haste  3  230  12  Inexperience  I  227  11  Communication problem  5  182  9  Inadequate preop' assessment  2  138  7  Monitor problem  5  116  6  Inadequate preop' preparation  2  87  4  Unfamiliar environment/equipment  I  77  4  Inadequate assistance  5  66  3  Fatigue  3  59  3  Drug label  5  58  3  Other stress  3  47  2  Lack of facility  5  38  2  Staff change  5  25  1  Illness  3 thought to give rise to them. This inevitably represents an over-simplification; indeed, several of the elements represented by Type 1-4 errors may be involved in the genesis of some incidents and accidents. Nevertheless, this classification does provide a basis for developing strategies which may be useful for trying to reduce the frequency with which some of these incidents and accidents occur. 3 
070

Error of judgement
TABLE 2
Factors minimising the outcome in the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS,' ranked according to the frequency with which they were "ticked" on the report form. a At least one human factor' (Types 1, 2) was "ticked" in 941 (47%) of the 2000 incidents " More than one category may have been "ticked" per incident b Types 1-5; see footnote b of Table I Knowledge-based Errors (TYpe 1, Tables 1-3 ). These are the result of the wrong intention or making the wrong plan, and are due to inadequate knowledge or experience. 3 They are thought to be represented by "error of judgement", "inexperience" and "unfamiliar equipment or environment" (16, 11 and 4070 of incidents, respectively) amongst the "factors contributing" in Table 1 , by "prior experience or awareness" (35070 of incidents) amongst the' 'factors minimising the outcome" in Table 2 , and by "additional training" and "quality assurance activity" (11070 each of all incidents) amongst the "suggested corrective strategies" in Table  3 . At least one of these factors was "ticked" in 1156 (58070) of the 2000 incidents.
Traditionally, much emphasis has been placed on increasing and updating the knowledge-base of medical practitioners. Indeed, the length of the undergraduate and postgraduate training is dictated, at least to some extent, by the amount of knowledge that has to be assimilated. Inadequate knowledge or inexperience were thought by the reporters to have contributed directly to about one quarter of incidents. This judgement was, of course, made in retrospect, but is valuable because it is a "self-assessment" and, ultimately, only the reporter can make such a judgement. The outcome of over a third of all incidents was thought by the reporters to have been minimized by prior experience or awareness, and in one in five some proposal to improve knowledge was suggested as a corrective strategy. In over half of all the incidents some "knowledge-based" factor was thought to have been involved in the genesis of the incident, in reducing its outcome or to have the potential to reduce the incidence or severity of such an incident in the future. This underlines the complexities and wide range of the problems encountered by the anaesthetist, and justifies continued efforts to encourage participation in the various quality assurance and continuing medical education programs on offer.
Rule-based errors (7j;pe 2, Tables 1-3 ). These involve the failure to apply a rule designed to avoid error or minimise adverse outcome, the application of a bad or inadequate rule, or the misapplication of a rule in some problem-solving situation. J They are thought to be represented by "failure to check equipment", "inadequate preoperative assessment", and "inadequate preoperative preparation" amongst the "factors contributing to incidents" (Table 1) (13, 7 and 4% of incidents respectively), by "recheck of equipment" and "staff change" amongst the "factors minimising outcome" ( Table 2 ) (15 and 2% of incidents, respectively) and by "equipment checking discipline", "specific protocol development", and "improved communication" (19, 10 and 10% of incidents, respectively) amongst the "suggested corrective strategies" in Table  3 . At least one of these factors was "ticked" in 936 (47%) of the 2000 incidents.
There are well understood "rules" in anaesthetic practice regarding what is required for the thorough preoperative assessment and preparation of patients and for checking the equipment before starting a case. It is clear that reporters recognised deficiencies in their own performance in these areas in one fifth of all incidents.
"Failure to check equipment" incidents included those in which essential equipment was absent, was turned "off", was incorrectly calibrated, or was not in working order. A full range of problems occurred with "failure to check" patients ranging from operations on the "wrong side" or "wrong patient" to producing a drug reaction because of administering a drug to which the patient was known to be allergic.
There is no question that the aviation industry has recognised and comprehensively addressed these "rulebased" problems with well thought-out checklists with which the vast majority of pilots comply. There would seem to be a good argument for more well thoughtout structured checklists to be developed in clinical medicine. Some pre-anaesthetic assessment forms already have such lists, particularly those designed for use in some day-surgery units.
The AIMS data in this symposium indicate that there is much room for improvement in this area. It is evident, for example, that up to 30% of anaesthetists are conducting cases without the oxygen analyser being turned on, a further significant percentage with the alarm disabled, and even some of the remainder are not calibrating the device before use. 6 A requirement to "tick" boxes on a structured form would reduce the incidence of such non-compliance with guidelines.
A further means by which our performance may be improved is by applying structured approaches to certain routine procedures as well as to emergency situations. Standard protocols for storing, drawing up, diluting, labelling and administering drugs are likely to reduce the current high error rate. 7 Application of the crisis management algorithm outlined elsewhere in this symposium will improve the speed and/or efficacy with which problems are handled in up to 1 in 8 incidents. ' There is a clear need for written algorithms for diagnosing and managing problems such as air embolism, anaphylaxis and malignant hyperthermia as these problems do not occur sufficiently frequently for the practising anaesthetist to remain skilled in their management; there are now AIMS data to support this contention. '" Overall, rule-based errors contributed to about onequarter to one third of all incidents. However, by eliminating these existing problems and implementing appropriate rule-based corrective strategies a positive impact could be made on nearly half of all incidents. Work is currently being carried out to develop and publish a manual of standard pro to cols and crisis management algorithms. Such a manual should be on every anaesthetic machine, and simple-ta-use checklists should be incorporated into routine documentation.
Skill-based errors. These include "slips" and "lapses", errors to which skilled operators are particularly prone. J Skill constitutes the ability to carry out several tasks simultaneously. The limited capacity of our "high level" cognitive processor dictates that these tasks must be carried out at a lower level, on "auto-pilot". The more skilled an operator is, the more tasks can be carried out in parallel at this level. The price that is paid, however, for running several familiar sub-routines simultaneously, is that quite complex inappropriate sequences of action can be "captured" (often with a cue that is similar, but not identical, to the required one) and enacted. Anything which distracts or degrades the monitoring function of the high-level processing unit renders an operator more liable to "slips" and "lapses".
Factors thought to be associated with these errors include: "inattention", "haste", "fatigue", "other stress" and "illness" (12, 12, 3, 2 and 111,10 of incidents respectively) amongst the "factors contributing to incidents" (Table 1) , and "fatigue alleviation routines" (211,10) amongst the "suggested corrective strategies" (Table 3 ). At least one of these factors was "ticked" in 475 (24%) of the 2000 incidents.
An awareness on the part of the anaesthetist of the mechanism of these types of error may in itself be of some value in reducing their incidence. To "press on regardless" with insufficient sleep or to try to carry out multiple tasks at once (e.g. organizing an emergency case on the telephone whilst anaesthetising a patient and trying to teach a student, all at the same time) should be regarded as risky behaviour. The vast majority of "wrong drug" errors are "slips", and many of those reported to AIMS were associated with the factors listed above; three-quarters of these had the potential to be fatal. 7 Thus, whilst the mechanism by which these errors occur might seem somewhat mundane and trivial, the consequences may not be. Also, the cause and effect relationship is frequently very obvious, placing the person who was subject to the slip or lapse at risk of litigation. Overall, at least 10% of all incidents were thought to be due directly to a slip or lapse, and an element of a skill-based error of some sort was thought to have contributed to up to one quarter of all incidents.
Technical Errors. These arise when failure to execute the sequence of actions required for a technique in exactly the right way may result in an undesired outcome or no outcome at all. The anaesthetist is occupationally exposed to such errors, particularly when probing invisible parts of the body with needles.
The "see one do one" approach is not to be encouraged. Technical errors are represented by the "fault of technique" category in Table 1 (13% of incidents), and possibly by the "additional training" category in Table   Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 21, No. 5, October, 1993 3 (11 % of incidents). Overall, about I in 8 incidents was thought by the reporter to be due to a fault in technique. In the past, few aids have existed to assist in learning techniques. However, items such as transparent anatomical models for teaching regional blocks, intubation and resuscitation mannequins, and "artificial veins" for learning to gain vascular access are all increasing in availability and sophistication.
Problem-Specific Solutions: Although it is helpful to know that all types of human error contribute to incidents and accidents, defining the relative importance of each type in particular clinical situations is more likely to contribute to the development of appropriate preventative strategies. For example, it is a common opinion that the "wrong drug" problem is mainly due to deficiencies in ampoule labelling. AIMS data show that even if this problem was comprehensively addressed, the majority of cases in which the wrong drug was actually injected into a patient would not be prevented. 7 The importance of slips and lapses in the genesis of this problem was clearly demonstrated; this led to the suggestion of a series of strategies to try to reduce the incidence of these events. Likewise, AIMS showed that the failure of the oxygen analyser to pick up the majority of cases of "failure of the oxygen supply" or "hypoxic gas mixture" was due almost entirely to a rule-based error (failure to check), encouraged by the poor design of the "high" oxygen alarm. 6 A clear understanding of the nature of the problem has allowed the development of a strategy which will solve it; this revolves around anaesthetists being required to document that they have sited, checked and calibrated the oxygen analyser (and its "low" alarm) correctly before use. The use of the classification system outlined elsewhere in this symposium will facilitate determining the relative importance of the various types of human error for a recurring problem (see Figure 5 , p. 517). 3 Other Human Factors. There are further "human factors" to which medical practitioners, including anaesthetists, may be prone which render them liable to human error. It is almost a "tradition" for clinicians to deny fatigue, anxiety, illness and, sometimes, lack of adequate experience with a particular procedure. Doctors pride themselves on their capacity to handle any situation no matter how adverse the context. Thus, as a group they are resilient "reactive" workers and will generally take on very difficult problems in adverse circumstances with a high level of enthusiasm and commitment. However, this approach may so dominate in the work "ethos" that the capacity to adopt a proactive rather than reactive approach may be limited. For example, to re-schedule the non-urgent fixation of mUltiple long-bone fractures from 2 a.m. (with ex-hausted junior staff) to 8 a.m. (with fresh staff backed up by senior consultants) may be regarded with opprobrium.
There are still clinicians who pride themselves on being able to work all day after being up all night, although this is regarded as being quite unacceptable in most other work-places. Sleep deprivation has been conclusively shown to result in cognitive impairment. 12 When things go wrong, a sleep-deprived anaesthetist will have far less chance of being able to respond appropriately, particularly to a complex problem.
Some of these characteristics may be regarded as being desirable in hospitals in which much of the activity takes place on an "ad hoc" basis, and in which the vast majority of emergency work is undertaken "out-of-hours" so that elective lists are not interfered with. Even with elective lists, an anaesthetist may be "pressured" into taking on a patient who has been illprepared, just so as not to "let the side down". The recent emphasis on efficiency and cost-saving provides a further incentive to proceed so that the staff scheduled for the case are not "wasted" and so that the patient will not be detained in hospital until the next elective list. This compliant approach may make for a harmonious working situation; however, it is the patients who end up at increased risk. When a disaster does occur as a result of inadequate preparation the "urgers" are usually noticeable by their absence.
Although the caricature of the "press-an-regardless" anaesthetist rendered above is representative of only a small minority, it is nevertheless important that these patterns of practise be progressively changed. Indeed, in recent years attitudes have changed very considerably, and the vast majority of our surgical and other colleagues cooperate fully in ensuring that the elective patient is properly prepared. Nevertheless, the onus for ensuring that standards are always maintained should be moved, where possible, from the individual to the system. Thus, it should not be up to the individual to have to cancel an elective list after being up all night; the "system" should have an inbuilt contingency plan or should automatically dictate that the list does not proceed under those circumstances.
The compromised colleague. A further aspect
of human failure is that of the practitioner with deteriorating faculties due to illness or ageing, or who has temporarily impaired performance due to a major life-crisis. "Experience" and "knowledge" will offset these problems to some extent, although the time will come for all of us when it would be better to curtail or cease our clinical activities. Legislation is now in place to indemnify committees of peers from legal action when they limit the activities of doctors whose competence is waning; to do so gradually, in an incremental manner, would seem preferable to a sudden, complete "cut-off" of clinical privileges. An anaesthetist may be perfectly safe during working hours in a suite of ten operating theatres, supported by several colleagues, particularly if he or she is prepared to seek help when uneasy about a particular case. However, it may be quite inappropriate to allow or expect the same individual to handle a critically ill patient with multiple injuries on his or her own in the early hours of the morning.
Most systems have not made adequate provision for those who need to curtail their activities or to retire early; attention needs to be directed to this area.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, AIMS has confirmed that there are elements of "human error" in over 80070 of incidents and accidents.
The emphasis in the past has been on increasing and updating the knowledge-base. The AIMS data confirm that none of this has been misplaced and that continued effort must be put into education and "refresher courses". However, the AIMS data have also revealed that significant improvements may be achieved b~' more emphasis on eliminating rule-based errors, on developing and disseminating standard protocols and algorithms, on gaining insight into the mechanisms by which slips and lapses occur, and on increasing the availability of sophisticated aids to learning techniques.
The relative contributions of the various types of human error in different clinical situations may be determined by careful analysis of the data, and strategies may be developed to modify the human error component of each problem. Clearcut policies, protocols and guidelines will help to take the onus for maintaining adequate standards off the individual and place it on "the system". This is becoming increasingly important as financial pressures are being brought to bear on all those who work in clinical medicine. Placing more emphasis on developing safe systems will be addressed in the final paper in this symposium.
